





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(Above appendices are att on limited distribution only)



S E C R E T

G Int 7/1 C Corps/1/10
16 May 45

1 CDN CORPS POST MORTEM NO 5

INTRODUCTION

It has not been our policy in the past to inflict more than the normal amount of verbiage on our gentle and long suffering public. But times have changed, the war has ended, a large staff of editors and sub-editors has descended upon us, and as a result a growing sense of we-ought-to-produce-something has resulted in this anything but vest-pocket size compendium.

But there is, as might be suspected, more to it than that. In HOLLAND, at the time of the German Capitulation, we were in the unique position of being in possession of a complete German Army - the 25th - with no outside fmns to confuse or amuse us. As a result a good deal of research is going on into this interesting phenomenon, and these following pages, with some exceptions, are the initial findings of our probes and explorers.

From time to time, for this fifth Post Mortem by no means finishes our academic interest in 25 Army, further issues will come your way until the pith and substance of the German comd and fmns in Western HOLLAND have been put down in black and white; and then, like the Bedouin to his tent we shall slide gracefully and silently away into the all-enveloping darkness of the night.

JMEC/mcb

J. E. Clarkson
for Chief of Staff
Time of signature 2240 B hrs
SDS/POST/HAND/ADLS



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THE SURRENDER1. THE GENERAL STAFF WAITS


"We in our haste can only see the small components of the scene....."

With the failure of the putsch of 20 July 1944 the German General Staff had failed. Most of its members realised not only that this war was lost but that to continue it was to reduce their power to prepare for the next. Until Hitler died all they could do was to hang on, disbelieving in but still hopping for, a miracle. With Hitler dead, they immediately set in motion a programme of salvage. By a coup d'etat DOENITZ seized Himmler and vestigial power. The new regime is not National Socialism writ small; it is the German General Staff conducting another rearguard. Moreover, it is evident that those who now abuse Hitler (and many have old scores or old friends to avenge) blame him not because he was disgusting but because he was unsuccessful. It is the German General Staff who will learn most quickly from Hitler's mistakes.

The aim of the DOENITZ Government is not to drive a wedge between the Russians and the WESTERN Allies. Rather do they assume that one exists already (and the Polish problem is a German godsend) and that they must be WEST of it. Such temporizing as has been evident in the last week may be explained only partly by the refusal of even senior offrs to take responsibility readily (and since the decisions have been enormous, this need not surprise us) but also because they assume that once the jaws close, nothing and nobody will be salvaged from Russian-occupied GERMANY. That area is a write-off, to them one vast SIBERIA. Therefore every day's delay offered the hope that more men might get into the British and American lines; ostensibly to till the soil, to gather the harvest, strategically as stallion salvage. The brilliant organisation by which foreign helots released an enormous warrior class to conquer EUROPE rested on the continued success of the warriors. Now a new and improved tactic must be adopted. To the German General Staff what remains of GERMANY is what has been occupied from the WEST. DOENITZ is the residuary legatee. The first anxiety is to avoid starvation and it may be that the first time some of the German General Staff realised how unpleasant war is was when they found themselves sitting in a little neck of land surrounded by a million German wounded without anaesthetics, bandages or drugs: part of the salvage had gone sour.

They had realised for a long time that backseat driving of the Nazi bandwagon was no good any more, for it had run out of gas, although it continued to run very fast downhill. With a peculiarly arrogant despair, the ephemeral convenience could be kicked into the ditch, useful now only as a scapegoat. The time had come, to many of them it was overdue, to transfer bag and baggage (and the Staff offrs all have handkerchiefs even if the German wounded have no bandages) to another vehicle. The aim now must be to make themselves indispensable to the WESTERN Allies. That is the reason why there is so little sabotage, so little subversive activity. Only silly little men would do anything like that at this stage. OKW itself has ostentatiously stamped on any attempt, trading in infm about Werewolves and clobbering the SS, best of scapegoats. Superficially and temporarily the German General Staff is playing. For a while there is no alternative. They are willing to play because they want employment: They are willing to play because thereby they may retain coherence: they

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- 4 -

are willing to play because they reckon they may be able to play us for suckers.

A mood of complacency may spring up when all WESTERN GERMANY seems peaceful, the harvest is being gathered and undernourishment is making the Germans less effective. The malignant fungus will not make its awkward reappearance just yet; this is not the time. The German General Staff will try to hold on until we thin out. Give them a tent and a telephone and all the plans for a new Hundred Thousand Army would soon be ready. But it would not be mustered until we were thinner on the ground. Meanwhile they are regrouping.

(Source: 21 Army Group Review No 189 dated 8 May 1945)

2. THE SURRENDER OF COLONEL-GENERAL BLASKOWITZ 5 MAY 1945


Prior to the actual surrender, the preliminaries were discussed with General REICHELT, Chief of Staff to BLASKOWITZ. This time, instead of the small wayside house which had been used for all conferences up till that date, the shell-scarred hotel in the small village of WAGENINGEN was chosen as a more suitable location. At the time of the first meeting the village was packed with the food convoys nosing their way through the narrow streets towards the German lines. At the same time from the other direction came staff cars and jeeps containing those taking in the deliberations and, for the first time, the gentlemen of the press. At 1100 hours a grubby Volkswagen under escort pushed its way through this mass of orderly confusion in the direction of the hotel. General REICHELT with his escort dismounted and looking neither to right nor left hurried into the conference room. There about 50 correspondents were lined up along one side of the big dining room, and on the other side a table was set apart at which the Corps Comd 1 Cdn Corps, his Chief of Staff, the interpreter were sitting ready for negotiations to begin.

How different from the last time at the food conferences when the Germans were still masters of their destinies even though their future at that time could hardly have been termed favourable. This time the Germans came in knowing full well that they had been ordered by higher authority to surrender. This time there was no attempt to prevaricate, argue or in any way hinder the conversations.

General FOULKES opened proceedings by reading over the general terms of surrender which had been received from SHAEF. The German replied with what infm he had at that time available, which had been received from DOENITZ. His voice was low and his eyes averted as one after another points revealing the shattering reality of his posn were explained to him. Some of the more important topics discussed included the immediate opening of the EDE-UTRECHT rd, the standstill order, responsibilities of the German staffs at all levels, the posn of the Dutch SS, the German order of battle, and the immediate removal of the charges from all the dykes. These were gone through one by one, approval was signified by a nod and just the one word "understood"; otherwise there was no reply from the other side of the table.

It was arranged that General BLASKOWITZ would meet the Corps Commander at 1600 hrs that afternoon in order to receive the the full surrender terms and sign them on the dotted line. After discussions had concluded a brief opportunity was given to enquire into the number of tps in HOLLAND which up till that time had been estimated as up to 150,000. In point of fact General REICHELT stated that all, including Army, Navy and Air Force, were approx 115,000 to 120,000 in number.

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Proceedings then came to an end and the General returned to his car. With a loud popping noise the Volkswagen disappeared down the street only to get hopelessly entangled in a food convoy about a hundred yards down. What an opportunity for the Press: Cameras clicked, cinecameras turned and eager questions were asked concerning the function, name and general background of the German party. Thus ended the preliminaries to the larger conference which was to take place that afternoon at 1600 hrs.


The afternoon affair was even more crowded with press representatives. In addition to the normal fixtures and fittings of a conference, a battery of floodlights shone down on the assembled company. General BLASKOWITZ, with the Chief of Staff, driving in separate cars made their way to the village hall, and in like manner to the morning proceedings, rapidly entered the building. General BLASKOWITZ a man of 61, standing about 5'8", stooping slightly, grubby and unshaven, looked a very tired and disconsolate man. This General had commanded an army in the field since the Polish campaign, but had never managed to attain the rank of Field Marshal. The reason for this was given by one of his staff, who explained that it was a result of the protest BLASKOWITZ made at the mishandling of the Polish people at the conclusion of the Polish campaign. Present also at this meeting was the General's chief "Q" Staff offr, one who had figured so largely in the food discussions, and who now minced in with the same superior bearing for which he had been noted on previous occasions.

The terms of surrender were read over by General FOULKES, and BLASKOWITZ hardly answered a word. Occasionally he would interpose with a demand for more time to carry out the orders given to him, otherwise nothing was said from the German side. They looked like men in a dream, dazed, stupefied and unable to realise that for them their world was utterly finished. Instead of orders from the Führer's HQ, the orders were now to come from the Allies, and for the German soldier this took a good deal of swallowing. General REICHEL during these proceedings adopted the same dignified gloom, but later when the meeting broke up showed himself capable of appreciating a joke even at his own expense. He produced the dispositions and strengths of the units in HOLLAND and answered further questions of a general nature. He corroborated the evidence that had been gleaned from air photographs concerning the damage done to the various HQ which had been attacked by the fighter bombers. Three times, he states, he had had to leave his lunch and dive for the bunker. This has since been substantiated after a visit to 25 Army HQ which shows that all the houses surrounding the main bunker had been harshly treated by 84 Group.

Proceedings came to an end somewhat hurriedly as BLASKOWITZ became slightly impatient at the lengthy discussion that His Chief of Staff was conducting. His Chief of Staff noticed the red light, excused himself, collected up his papers and departed in the tracks of his commander. A great concourse had collected outside the hotel, and once again batteries of photographic paraphernalia went into action. The day was fine and results were good. Many direct hits were scored. No cameras were missing.

Thus ended a memorable day. HOLLAND, as a country, was saved. Inundations, though serious in one or two places, had been warded off, food was going in and the great cities protected from the horrors of direct siege. The good people of HOLLAND had been spared the horrors of war in the richest and most populous part of their country.

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3. A VISIT TO HQ TWENTY FIFTH ARMY

These notes are written from conversations held on 8 May 1945 at HILVERSUM between certain Staff Offrs of First Cdn Army and of HQ Twenty Fifth German Army. They serve to record some of the more interesting infm received, insofar as it was not already known.

(a) The Headquarters

Some difficulty was met in finding the locations of the HQ in HILVERSUM. 49 Divisional FS Section, however, provided a Resistance guide who brought us to the gate of the HQ. The whole area, a wooded suburb of HILVERSUM, had evidently been taken over by the Germans and the houses used as billets and messes. In the Centre, round the bunker, they had been well Jabbed (fighter-bombed) and rocketed.

The bunker itself was the impressive sight. Well cam, it stands about 80 ft by 50 ft, with the roof 15 ft above ground. The entrance led down some steps into the eye of a loophole and round the corner into a central passage. The concrete looked about 10 ft thick and it appeared untouched, although houses all round were smashed and sagging. Inside there were a dozen or more offices, of which we visited five: those of the Chief of Staff, Genlt-Maj; Operations; Intelligence; the Intelligence office; and the War Room. There was also a clerk's office with a window at which appeared the head of a Stabsheilerin (ALS), who withdrew with an "oops" on seeing us. The offices were air-conditioned, had fluorescent lighting and were well-appointed, with masses of flowers and Dutch paintings. Each had a good wireless, a bed and some unobtrusive maps.

(b) The Christmas Party


The Christmas MAAS offensive was definitely on. REICHELTH had got the plan from 88 Corps as follows; 346 Div was to cross from SCHOUWEN with main effort on DINTELOORD, and also on ST PHILIPSLAND. 712 Div was to form a bridgehead SOUTH of PERENBOOM. 711 Division was to pass through 712 Div and the three divs were to advance on BREDA and ANTWERP. 6 Para Div was to form a bridgehead SOUTH of HIDEEL and provide left flank protection on the advance. Two bns of paratroopers coming from the PADERBORN area were to be dropped on objectives as yet unrevealed. Also, a specially equipped regiment was to cross from OVERFLAKKEE on to SOUTH BEVELAND, seize the NORTH-SOUTH Canal and pass through the small naval battle units, who, in conjunction with arty on SOUTH BEVELAND, would harry the SCHELDT. The operation was to depend wholly on the success of the ARDENNES offensive.

The Chief of Staff was not quite certain about the dates, but it would appear that the operation was envisaged for the 25-27 Dec 1944. On about the 27 Dec it was put off, and as 88 Corps was progressively shorn of its divs, it was abandoned. It is hoped that further details will be obtained, revealing the whole plan.

(c) Formation of HQ Twenty Fifth Army

General CHRISTIANSEN's HQ, as C-in-C NETHERLANDS, was originally formed to parallel the civil administration of the Reichskommissar. Its chief function was administrative and training, and later it received an increased number of engrs to construct the coastal defs. 88 Corps was responsible for operations under Fifteenth Army. When Fifteenth Army left the area, HQ Twenty Fifth Army was formed from HQ C-in-C NETHRELANDS.

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It was necessary to make radical changes in the staff as the old one consisted of nothing but a lot of old Father Christmases (alte Weihnachtsmänner).. The change of command was sudden, and one gathered that it produced some confusion.

(d) Flooding and Defensive Policy

Genlt REICHELT produced a map showing the flooding already carried out. If we had crossed the GREBBE Line, immediately a further line behind UTRECHT would have been flooded, and so on until the whole country was under water. In particular, sea water would have been let in at IJMUIDEN. The civilians would have drowned, but it was a military operation, so what? Of course, the Germans would have drowned too. He did not think, with the forces and eqpt at our disposal, that we would attempt to advance or that we would get on very fast if we did come. Asked why the WIERINGERMEER POLDER was flooded, he said it was to reduce the area to be held in the deffs of DEN HELDER. Evidently, he feared an attack along the AFSLUITSDIJK, but not a waterborne crossing to MEDEMBLIK or ENKHUIZEN. He considered the coast from AMSTERDAM to EDAM more suitable for a landing.

The General expanded somewhat to make one or two general remarks about the situation in HOLLAND. He said that there was only food enough for five or six days from the time the food started rolling into HOLLAND. If the food had not come they would have had 4½ million starving people on their hands. In the case of his own forces, his tps had only two days expenditure of amm at full rates. His AFVs consisted of five: three assault guns and two Shermans.

(e) MODEL

Field Marshal MODEL, C-in-C Army Group "B", was in OOSTERBEEK at the time of the ARNHEM drop, which came within a kilometre of him. He got out in a hurry.


(f) Attacks on Fuel Dumps

REICHELT admitted the delicate condition of fuel supply and the embarrassment caused by our air attacks. He recalled with enthusiasm, however, two misses. Once a dump at ZWOLLE was attacked with cannon and three tks were holed, but by a fortunate chance none burned. Another time some crude oil was lit by ground personnel to give the impression that an attack had been successful; the dump was not attacked again.

(g) Conclusion

The highlight of the day came at 1500 hours. CHURCHILL was to speak, so we requested the use of a room apart to listen in. We were led into the Y-room, where a set was already tuned to the BBC. According to a Y offr, a continual watch was always kept on that valuable source of intelligence. The various English-speaking German offr then asked if they could stay, and having received permission settled themselves to listen intently and seriously. Afterwards they judged the speech able and short. At the end the whole company stood for the King.

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PERSONALITIES1. MUSSERT(a) The Man

Generally known as the Dutch "QUISLING", MUSSERT, who is now reported to have been captured at The HAGUE, has been described by a very well-informed and reliable PW as dictatorial, grasping, half-educated and pedantic. Aged in the early fifties, this squat and generally unpopular leader of the Dutch Nazis is said to have been more Fascist than Nazi before 1940, and to have dreaded the unification of HOLLAND with GERMANY on account of his fear that the result would entail a loss of justification for his own official existence. He preferred the idea of a Germanic "Bund" of states in which HOLLAND would be an equal member, with himself as "Leider" (Führer), whereas the German and Dutch SS members and supporters of a Greater GERMANY favoured the idea of the NETHERLANDS being made a "Gau" with someone other than MUSSERT as "Gauleiter". The latter made several attempts to form a government of his own in HOLLAND but was no more successful than was QUISLING in NORWAY.

MUSSERT was married to his own aunt, a woman some 15 yrs older than himself, whose considerable wealth did her husband much harm. He was a non-smoker and in imitation of HITLER nobody was allowed to smoke in his presence or in his headquarters. By the same token, he did NOT drink, but compensated for this by continuously eating sweets and encouraging his supporters to give him presents of every description, including food. The fact that in the momentous days of 1940 he hid in a barn had NOT done his reputation any good.

(b) Correspondence Between HITLER and MUSSERT

MUSSERT himself called his correspondence with HITLER by the name of "notes". These literary effusions were always very voluminous consisting of between 20 to 30 pages of foolscap paper. It is most probable, therefore, that these were by no means read through to the end by such a man as the unsteady Adolf.


These letters were partly written by MUSSERT himself and partly by his experts in the various branches, which explains the lack of uniformity in style. The same applied to MUSSERT's speeches.

When the "notes" were ready for despatch they were NOT sent direct to HITLER, but were always discussed by MUSSERT in collaboration with SCHMIDT, the 'Oberbereichsleiter' of the N.S.D.A.P., so that anything which might be construed as slighting GERMANY and thus HITLER could be erased. The correspondence had to show the correct Nazi mentality.

The correspondence was then handed to Reichskommissar SEYSS-INQUART whose approval was also necessary. Usually, the letters had to be further altered or modified to suit his taste so that in point of fact MUSSERT was "writing through the spectacles of both SCHMIDT and SEYSS-INQUART". MUSSERT's literary style was like his life, a pose, entirely unnatural and purposely pedantic.

MUSSERT's first long note to HITLER was in Sep 1940, stating that he was nettled because the Führer had NOT sent for him (MUSSERT) immediately following the German invasion of HOLLAND.

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The German Nazis, however, intended to feel their way cautiously. **They** thus ordered the German Nazis in HOLLAND immediately after the invasion on no account to fraternize with the Dutch Nazis, but to await developments. Only after the failure to gather all Dutch parties in the "Union" (Unie) did HITLER concern himself with the Dutch Nazi parties.

Consequent upon the successes of German arms, membership of the N.S.B. had risen in the summer of 1940 to about 100,000 so that in comparison with the Dutch section of the N.S.D.A.P. (the N.S.N.A.P.) and a few other insignificant Dutch Nazi parties, the N.S.B. was by far the strongest, although entirely insignificant in influence upon the greater mass of the Dutch population.

The population of HOLLAND completely rejected the Dutch Nazi Parties, in point of fact they hated these more than they did the Germans as they considered the Dutch Nazis to be traitors. HITLER decided, therefore, to follow the proposal of SEYSS - INQUART to incorporate the N.S.N.A.P. with the N.S.B. from the point of view of usefulness.

NOT all the members of the N.S.N.A.P. were willing to do this as the name of MUSSERT was anathema to them. They therefore entered German Nazi organisations, sent their children to German schools etc as their political goal was the incorporation of HOLLAND into GERMANY. They continued to work against the N.S.B. and were very active as informers for the German Nazis.


As HITLER continued to wrap himself in silence concerning the Dutch situation, MUSSERT had to make the first conciliatory move in order to remain politically alive under the protection of the German Nazis. In Sep 1940 MUSSERT sent his first "note" to HITLER in which he thanked the Führer for having saved EUROPE from Anglo-American capitalism... The he went on in a long-winded essay concerning the history and development of the Dutch people, how the Dutch people were of Germanic stock and therefore a brother race of the Germans etc. MUSSERT, however, always spoke of "Gross Deutschland" and never of "Gross Germanien" as he himself feared a development in the latter direction even at that early stage. The "note" culminated in an expression of loyalty from all Dutch Nazis, which he (MUSSERT) pronounced in their name.

MUSSERT never received a written reply from HITLER to this "note". HITLER never wrote any reply to any of MUSSERT's "notes". The answer was passed on to MUSSERT verbally by SEYSS-INQUART which annoyed MUSSERT intensely.

The more the war seemed to be decided in favour of GERMANY the more did Nazi and SS circles concern themselves with the idea of the Great Germanic Empire. Entire books were devoted to this theme. MUSSERT on the contrary was in favour of a Germanic Alliance which he discussed in a long letter to HITLER in 1941. MUSSERT proposed a conference of all Germanic natives, at which he would be the protagonist of such an Alliance. HITLER would be the leader of all the Germanic peoples in the Alliance with himself, MUSSERT, as leader of the NETHERLANDS. The small states would retain their own culture but militarily and politically Gross Deutschland would play the leading role. The channel coast would remain German as a springboard against ENGLAND. He, MUSSERT, was ready to discuss these projects verbally with HITLER. His conclusion was a panegyric directed to HITLER as EUROPE's saviour from the BOLSHIEVICS.

Nothing came of these plans for a conference of the Germanic States as they did NOT conform with HITLER's plans. When the Jews were deported and expropriated of their property, the members

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of the N.B.S. once again felt themselves to be ill-treated as they were given only the non-prosperous properties. They complained to MUSSERT about this who passed it on to SEYSS-INQUART. They got no satisfaction from SEYSS-INQUART, much to the satisfaction of the anti-N.S.B. groups of the other Dutch Nazis.

Thereupon MUSSERT sent a letter to HITLER in which he once again attacked Anglo-American capitalism and also German capitalism and its Dutch Ally. He defended himself against the reproach of being an anti-German. He declared in his letter "I am certainly an enemy of the German vulture but the greatest friend of the German eagle". To be told that a German vulture existed did NOT please HITLER and the net result obtained by MUSSERT was nil.


NOT having achieved success with his Germanic Alliance scheme, MUSSERT tried another trick. He got Nazi Jurists to draw up a document stating that there was no longer either a Queen of HOLLAND or a Dutch government, as the Dutch constitution stated that should the king or queen leave HOLLAND without nominating a deputy, he or she ceased to be the sovereign. This the Queen had NOT done in May 1940, therefore MUSSERT claimed she was deposed.

The same principle applied to the Dutch Government as they had left the country. MUSSERT sent this appreciation in the form of a "note" to HITLER in the Autumn of 1943 and proposed himself to the Führer as the Prime Minister of a new Dutch Government on the lines of the QUISLING Government in NORWAY. He (MUSSERT) had a sufficiency of competent Nazi-minded officials to fill the vacant seats. The State Council too was to be reinstated in this fashion so that he (MUSSERT) could, as head of the new legal government, conclude a peace with GERMANY. It would then be possible for him to introduce conscription in HOLLAND and thereby place many press-ganged soldiers at HITLER's disposal. This scheme was likewise rejected by HITLER, as it did NOT conform with the latter's plans.

As a balm to MUSSERT's bruised vanity, SEYSS-INQUART declared in a long speech that the N.S.B. was the standard bearer of the Dutch people and that the leader of the N.S.B. was thereby leader of the Dutch people. In point of fact, the situation remained absolutely the same, otherwise SEYSS-INQUART would have had to leave his nice warm seat. Many conferences took place between the two and a Staatssekretariat was created, the costs of which - 500,000 Guilders a year - were debited to the Dutch tax payers. As MUSSERT continued to receive only rebuffs from the Germans and became aware of his impotence, he began to talk about retiring. He declared that he had less say in HOLLAND than a Prussian corporal. The German and Dutch SS and SD openly cursed MUSSERT and the N.S.B. or dubbed them "black marketeers" etc which to a great extent was true.

When SS Obergruppenführer RAUTER, on orders from HIMMLER, dissolved the Dutch Legion and transferred them into the Germanische SS without asking MUSSERT, MUSSERT was furious. About 70 men of the Dutch Legion refused to be transferred and were thereupon imprisoned. MUSSERT complained in a note to HITLER about this. The men were released after three months' imprisonment but were then transferred to the Service Corps and they thus became 2nd Class privates. This was a nasty rebuff for MUSSERT. NOT being able to gain anything from HITLER owing to HIMMLER's influence, MUSSERT resigned himself to the situation but made one more attempt to win over the Dutch people to his side

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He sent a note to HITLER and asked for 100,000 of the confiscated wireless sets which he wanted to distribute to "reliable" Dutchmen. He also asked for poplar wood to make footwear for the unshod Dutchmen. He received no answer to this request and the matter was NOT further discussed.

It is also interesting to study how MUSSERT tried to get the Royal property into his hands. He addressed a note to HITLER stating that the SS men were robbing and destroying priceless valuable articles in the Royal castles and that this fortune should really be handed over to the N.S.B. together with the control of all such properties. Naturally nothing came of this suggestion.

MUSSERT was granted only two or three audiences with HITLER and often had to wait a year for an interview. His chief complaint was that HIMMLER was always present with HITLER and so he could NOT open his heart about the malpractices of the SS men. MUSSERT's return from the Führer was always celebrated with a great deal of ceremony, but he had succeeded in obtaining absolutely nothing from his visits.

2. GENLT WALTER STEINMUELLER GOC DIVISION HAMBURG


Genlt Walter STEINMUELLER was captured under amusing circumstances. Div HAMBURG was completely liquidated in the Ruhr pocket by US forces pushing from the EAST on 16 Apr. The General and his orderly retreated on foot with the intention of reaching KIRCHHOF where the General's wife is currently residing. Wearing overalls and other civilian clothes, they were able to elude US patrols until 1 May when a group of worried housewives in a hamlet EAST of GUELTERSLOH mistook them for a couple of pillaging Russians and brought them to the attention of a US Security patrol. Taking to the fields as soon as they saw the US vehs, a warning blast from a sub-machine gun persuaded the pair to disclose their identities and become PW.

55 years old, Gen STEINMUELLER has had 33 yrs of active service. During the first World War he was an inf Lieut, he remained in Reichswehr after the war and held the rank of Lt Col at beginning of the current war. He took part in the Polish and French campaigns, then returned to GERMANY where he was active in supply activities until 1944. At the time of our invasion of FRANCE he was GOC of 364 Inf Div in CALAIS area. He commanded this Div only 6 weeks, until Oct 44 when it was destroyed. Later he was given command of 361 Inf Div.

The General was not too familiar with Div HAMBURG, as its Regts had been formed and committed before he assumed command and appeared sincere when he stated that during an earlier interrogation he had discovered that we knew more about his Div than he himself did. He also made it clear that under any but the current military situation he would have given only his name, rank and serial number. He deplored the lack of security consciousness among German PW and stated that they could learn much from the average American PW in this respect. In general, interrogation of American prisoners yielded nothing.

General STEINMUELLER reiterated the statements of other P generals that the conduct of the war has rested solely in the hands of Party leaders. Asked why they had continued to fight after the situation had become hopeless, he replied that even high ranking offrs have never been given an overall picture of the various fronts and have been kept going by constant promises of new weapons. He was skeptical about atrocities committed by the SS in concentration camps and otherwise, but said that very few Germans would know about them as there was no access to such infm.

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Regarding politics the General does not concur with the present form of National Socialism, but believes it to be preferable to Communism.

He further believes that our Airforce has been our most potent weapon, followed in effectiveness by our Armour and then by our arty. He would not express an opinion of our inf, saying that inf can only be judged when it fights without the support of other arms. STALINGRAD is described by him as having been the turning point in the war and from a military point of view, he thinks that an armistice should have been effected as soon as our landing in FRANCE was successful.

(Source: Ninth US Army).

3. GENERALFELDMARSCHALL GERD VON RUNDSTEDT


The removal of RUNDSTEDT, for the second time, from the post of Commander in Chief WEST, is rather like the final sacking of the last of the old family retainers. Except for BLASKOWITZ and BUSCH, not a single one of his contemporaries and successors in high command in 1939 to 1941 still has an operational assignment. A call of their names WELL illustrates the amount of military talent that HITLER and HIMMLER have managed to do without in their quest for final victory. The two other Army Group Comds, BOCK and LEEB, who led the assault on RUSSIA are said to be living on their estates, in the unlikely event of their still having estates to live on. MANNSTEIN and LIST are probably doing the same. REICHENAU and DOLLMANN are dead. KLEIST is a prisoner in Allied hands. KLUGE is dead. KUCHLER has vanished from the news. It is a tribute to RUNDSTEDT's staying power and indispensability that he survived as a commander in 1945.

The reasons given for his retirement are various and may easily all be true. He was old and feeble and the real operational work was done by WESTPHAL and MODEL; he wanted to capitulate after the failure of the ARDENNES offensive; he was regarded by the Army as a man with whom the Allies might negotiate. Since he was whisked away, little has been heard of him and that little is contradictory. Officially he is on the Führer-reserve of the OKH. He was also reported both to be in prison and to have a house reserved for him in BERCHTESGADEN. His recent capture at BAD TOLZ solved the mystery of his whereabouts.

Statements made by captured offrs show that HITLER's and HIMMLER's fears of RUNDSTEDT's prestige with the Army were not unfounded. "He is the only hope". "RUNDSTEDT is the only man who could have brought about a finale". "But", adds one source, "he thought too much of his own safety to make the attempt". It appears to have been believed in Army circles for some time that RUNDSTEDT was almost prepared to tell HITLER where to get off. But, like ZEITZLER and GUDERIAN, he never quite did so. Seventy yrs of belief in the sacredness of military leadership is not easy to shake away from. RUNDSTEDT's appearance as the President of the Court which tried the conspirators of 20 July dashed, although it did not altogether dispel, the hopes of a large number of offrs that the old Marshal might still negotiate a surrender while something remained of GERMANY.

The veneration of the Officer Corps for RUNDSTEDT rests upon a combination of long military success with personal qualities. His reputation as a commander was high even before the war. It was enlarged by his successes in FRANCE and POLAND and by his conduct of the operations of Army Group SOUTH in RUSSIA which

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
inflicted by cas on the Russian Armies and overran vast stretches of territory. Then RUNDSTEDT was removed, not, as far as one can make out, for failure, like GUDERIAN, but for the honourable reason that he objected to the Nazi method of treating the Russians. The def of the ATLANTIC WALL and the SIEGFRIED LINE was an anti-climax.

In his personal character the impression one gains of RUNDSTEDT from PW who served under him is of immense professional competence, sobriety of judgment, complete calm and, in general, affability and politeness. "I have never seen him rattled" one PW has related. "He is the personification of poise". His sense of the dignity of a German offr is very acute. The shocked tone of the document he issued, when he learned that discontented German soldiers were vanishing over the Spanish frontier before D-Day, is almost pathetic. And it is said that when after an RAF raid he had to evacuate his HQ at ST GERMAIN EN LAYE which he tolerated, and move to PARIS, which he loathed, he was really shaken by the enormity of a German Fieldmarshal being forced to move his quarters by a lot of young upstarts in four-engined bombers.

Yet through his character, almost Roman in its gravity and its lack of humour, runs one startling incongruity; an egregious tendency to tittle. The stories of RUNDSTEDT's drunkenness are too numerous and well-attested to be legendary. (The number of German offr reported to be drunk in a posn of command since D-Day would be an interesting piece of statistics). It is related that in RUSSIA he would constantly make abusive remarks about HITLER in his cups, to the embarrassment of his Chief of Staff, when visitors were present. The story goes also that on the evening of the raid on ST NAZAIRE he was as tight as an owl, but that all the morning after, with what must have been a monumental hangover, he stood listening to the reports of the commanders. In addition, his vocabulary is rich, even for a German, in the use of the word "Scheiss". A final curious touch is the story of the PW who said that the seventy-year old Marshal had a girl in KOBLENZ whom he almost married. The only portrait of him which ever seems to circulate must be at least twenty yrs old, and shows a stern tight-lipped face with tired, froglike eyes. Whether this was the one which was offered (signed) as a special decoration on the Western Front and which the Commanding General of 47 Volksgrenadier Div suggested was a less alluring award in the present desperate situation than fourteen days furlough, is not known. Such other photographs as there are usually show him with a greatcoat buttoned tightly up to the neck and a peaked cap pulled down over his nose, every inch a Fieldmarshal.

In case the Germans should make an effort to build up RUNDSTEDT as an enlightened "non-political" soldier who never liked the Nazis, one or two facts in his career are worth recalling. Between 1932 and 1938, the most hectic yrs of German rearmament, he was Commander of the key Wehrkreis III and of "Army Group I" based on BERLIN. There is every indication that throughout that time he gave HITLER his complete (and very influential) support and that though he may have disliked and despised the Nazis personally, his sympathies and actions were (and are) profoundly anti-democratic. Except for the quarrel which led to his removal from RUSSIA, he has never actively opposed HITLER at any time. In the ARDENNES offensive, 150 Panzer Brigade in its American uniforms came under his supreme command. Even though he probably did not order Sixth SS Panzer Army to take no prisoners, he can hardly plead ignorance of Operation GREIF. In any case, the ultimate responsibility for both these flagrant breaches of the Geneva Convention is his.

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


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RUNDSTEDT is a dangerous old man because, with the respect he inspires in the German Army, he has the makings of a figurehead. Far more than GUDERIAN he has the qualities for a second HINDENBURG. But he is nothing more than a terribly competent German soldier, trained in the German military mould to seek war and pursue it without any awkward questioning whether it is a right war or whether war is right at all. He is a luxury that the modern world can hardly afford again.

(Source: SHALF)

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25 ARMY HEADQUARTERSINTRODUCTION

This is an attempt to depict, in some detail, a static operational HQ of a German Army, as it was during the concluding days of the war. It is, in essence, a description of a nervous system, after the inevitable ravages of defeat, failure and decay has sapped the physical power of the body, leaving the controlling force impotent, and all but helpless to translate its functions into coherent action. Here the analogy ends, for though the body of the Wehrmacht had withered to a futile decrepitude, the mind remained active, and even brilliant, until the end.


The subject matter for this report, is drawn from a detailed study of 25 Army HQ. Centred in a residential district of HILVERSUM is the comd post, a concrete air raid shelter with 2½ meter thick walls. A limited but comprehensive part of the district had been wired off to provide living and exterior office accommodation for the various branches but all vital offices were concentrated in the BUNKER or shelter. This concentration had been speeded up and intensified after some remarkably accurate bombing by the RAF.

GENERAL

A first impression of 25 Army HQ is most difficult to put into words. The atmosphere of unreality which grips the imagination on entering the most secret places of an Army that one had fought against for years, is not only overwhelming, but it tends to distort any sort of objective general analysis. However one coherent emotion, dragged up most reluctantly, and therefore perhaps relatively honest, was a feeling of strong admiration for the purely military precision and functioning of the machine itself.

25 Army HQ is, in a word, a most compact, well designed, and hard working unit, whose strongest physical characteristic lies in its small size. The limited number of personnel employed to control an entire Army, is a most striking commentary, for better or for worse, on the general efficiency of the org. In fact, in actual size, 25 Army HQ resembles one of our Div HQs much more than an Army HQ. The WE of the org includes no more than four GS offrs below the rank of Col, 62 other offrs, 45 officials and 320 ORs while tpt for the HQ is limited to 59 MT and 43 MCs. It is claimed that all HQ offrs must have served in a Bn and from observation this is the case in 25 Army HQ. Some of the discrepancies between the corresponding Allied and German org may of course be explained by the static nature of German operations under 25 Army. However the fact remains that the individual effort and ability of each member of a German HQ is expected to be of an almost superhuman calibre. This is well illustrated by the case of the senior IO, who with a staff of one IO under him, considered himself lucky that he had sometimes been able to get as much as three hours sleep a night, during the 8 preceeding weeks. The General Staff Int Offr had been killed leading a battle gp at HEDEL and the lack of trained I personnel were contributory reasons in addition to the small WE. It was the rule, rather than the exception, that an ops offr would live for days at a time in his office, eating and sleeping there, when opportunity offered. The effects of this sort of life were of course very great and the subsequent general state of overwork and mental strain demanded, and to a fair degree achieved, a high state of simplification of normal work and routine. This effort at simplification had to be made in spite of the normal and constant demands for detail from both higher and lower fms. Therefore while senior offrs could, and did, make simplicity their key note junior offrs, WOs and NCOs found themselves completely unequal to the struggle and eventually took refuge from it all, threw in their hands, and with typical Germanic escapism, became complete automatons. Initiative was forgotten and the complete weight of decision, no matter how minor, was flung back into the laps of the senior commanders. On the other hand, the higher offrs and chiefs of branches, limited in numbers and badly fatigued, whilst realizing that the detailed

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work was essential, were forced to try and wash their hands of it, and to attempt to retain some degree of mental fluidity. They sought, as good comds do, to concern themselves primarily with the broad picture; yet at the same time they were forced to make decisions on all matters of small import. The result was that a minor problem would not be dealt with in its proper place by junior offrs, but would be decided by a senior offr with knowledge only of the extremely broad view point and with no knowledge of the detailed implications of the matter. This paragraph will no doubt have a most confusing effect on the reader, but it is as nothing to the degree of confusion which it instilled in the German system of cmd.

The plan, to enable senior comds to grasp and understand the higher picture by limiting the human sources of info, was helped primarily by the physiological character of the German race. Practically all of the offrs and senior NCOs met at 25 Army HQ were completely automatic, deadly inhuman, yet deadly efficient, specimens of a robot race. The sallies and witticisms of the C of S came as a surprising, even refreshing shock, in the midst of an atmosphere of impassive and apathetic acceptance of a life where human emotions were allowed to play no part.

The personnel of the Army Hq are divided into 5 main categories headed by a command gp. The other four divs are the Ops compound, the Tech Gp, the Adm Gp, Q which includes Q, Medical and Veterinary branches, and the Adm Gp A including AG, Pay, and Camp cmd. It is a matter of interest that since the HQ has always been static, no provision exists for a breakdown into Tac, Main and Rear HQs as we understand them; however since each gp contains the usual cmd section of a CO and a 2 I/C, a two way split could be easily accomplished in case of need.


Although the similarity of purpose between a German and an Allied HQ must of necessity demand the same general div of labour and branch responsibilities there exists in a German Army HQ a number of greater and lesser variations in method which are worthy of note. Most of these differences are superficial, and most are dictated primarily by the arbitrary demands of Army tradition and by the various and sometimes antiquated dictums of the inevitable 'book'. Of interest is the employment of personnel known as BEAMTEN or Officials, who, though paid on the same scale as corresponding offrs or NCOs, are in reality civilians in army uniform. These officials have very little executive responsibility and may NOT cmd tps. Most of them fall into the category of specialist or technical advisors to their army counterparts, and to some extent correspond to junior grade technical staff offrs in the British army, or to Civilian Technicians in the American Army.

A large number of women are employed to replace men for field service. Apparently only the female signals personnel are in the German Army, the rest, typists and the like, remain civilians in civilian dress.

It is interesting to note that at no time during our contacts with 25 Army HQ, were any SS offrs or men in evidence. This pleasant state of affairs may have occurred either by accident or by design, but it is felt that their conspicuous absence was more than likely due to the inherent loathing of the Army offrs at the HQ for the SS, and to the strong stand taken on the whole SS question by the C-in-C and C of S of the 25 Army.

In conclusion the attitude of the offrs and men to the allied occupation of 25 Army HQ and to the defeat of the German Army is a further manifestation of their robot mind. Little or no personal interest or curiosity about the future entered into their relations and although many of the files, had been destroyed the co-operation was efficient and businesslike; it is a machine which pretended never to have been oiled by human blood and which was prepared to run on for ever or pick up again after a temporary stopping of the motor.

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THE BRANCHES AND THEIR FUNCTIONS
(Based on the WE reproduced in Appx 'A')

The C-in-C is Col General BLASKOWITZ, about whom a more detailed study is to be found elsewhere in this Post Mortem. With him in the Comd Gp is Lt Gen REICHEL, the C of S, whose remarkable personality achieved for him not only respect but even affection from his staff, and the girls in the Shelter see to it that his room is never lacking in flowers. His sense of proportion and obvious understanding of the human being is exceptional amongst his fellow offrs. The C-in-C and C of S are attended by the same ADC, who together with an orderly offr make up the four responsible in Comd Gp for the direction of the whole army. Two batmen-orderlies see to the creature comforts and act as runners for the gp.

The Ops compound has the two remaining subdivisions of Ops and Int. The 6 Offrs of Ops (Ia) under Lt Col REHM, First General Staff Offr, supervise the execution of tactical orders and advise the C-in-C on plans and intentions which are otherwise the sole responsibility of the Comd Gp. An interesting development is the presence of the Fourth General Staff Offr Id Maj ECK, who is responsible for SD & Trg and the operational distribution of rfts, trg, org and the order of battle of German tps. The direction and distribution of rfts into the units is considered an integral part of the same work.


Int is handled by two offrs, with the help of a varying number of offr interpreters and interrogators, these being at present three. After the recent death of Maj FROMM the Third General Staff Offr Ic, while leading a battle gp in the HEDEL area, a Maj EICHORN took over the duties of senior IO. In addition to keeping the usual Int info up to date, of which a detailed description is given elsewhere, the Int staff is responsible for maintaining the morale of the German tps and takes over much of the work of welfare offrs. Since, however, the Nazi Party introduced NS political offrs this side of the work has become purely nominal. Field Security has its three offrs in the Ops Compound with the extremely difficult task of guarding mil sec in all its aspects without either kowtowing to the SD or treading on the toes of the Army Gestapo.

The third main subdivision combines the offices of Maj Gen Arty, CE, CSO and Gas Defs. Maj Gen PAUER, a verbose gunner, wept when handing over a list of his pieces. It was not clear whether they were tears of grief at their surrender or tears of relief at ridding himself of the incredible hotch potch of types, makes, dates, calibres and foreign manufactures. With an arty staff offr and an adjt the direction, tactical handling, and org of the available arty is carried out by Maj Gen PAUER. He also decides the rates of amn expenditure and advises the Q branch on the strategical amn dumping programme.

The CE, LT COL FISCHER, with his two offrs and a specialist engineering official discharges duties comparable to an Allied CE with but one exception. The Q branch hold and control the large dumps of engr stores and apart from which the CE may draw to compile his own local dumps and stores. When the Germans capitulated neither the Q branch nor the CE had any noteworthy engr stores, and what little existed was held by the engr coys themselves.

The CSO of 25 Army, Col RITTER, is assisted by his adjt, WT offr, line offr, cipher offr and an official to advise on tech signals matters. As an exception to the normal German practise of stores sup being allotted to the Q branch the CSO performs this duty in his own signals sphere without ref to Army Q. Once again the complaint of insufficient stores, especially WT, was made and in addition the CSO pointed out, that far from lightening his burden, his worries and work were increased a hundred fold. "Poverty, in spite of trappist philosophers is not an unmix'd blessing", according to one of his offrs.

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In 25 Army HQ there is no WE vacancy for an offensive CW offr and even the gas def offr vacancy is not filled. When asked why so little attention was paid to CW the Germans voiced a flattering trust in our fairness and observation of the HAGUE Convention. It also happens that Gas Def is a unit responsibility and offr material is scarce.

The Q gp is naturally the largest carrying out as it does many of the duties which Brit Staff Cpts perform for their department chiefs. It must be borne in mind that a large part of the sup system is horse drawn and this explains the fact that the veterinary services are under comd of the Q branch. The answer to why med services too are in the same dependant posn may perhaps be found in the German equation of horses, machines and men. Pay and postal services are further sub branches of the whole.


Col MÜNCHBERG, the AQMG, is the personification of cold robot efficiency. A quick grasp of the situation, an experience of precedents on similar questions and an automatic exact answer given in words, annoying in their supercilious preciosity, is the working method of Col MÜNCHBERG. The frigid flash of the eye when a subordinate even dares to give an answer in four words instead of three; the bloodless upright carriage, immaculate but unostentatious dress; the watery tensing of lip muscles at what he deduced from others' smiles must be a witticism; are the outward signs of the inner automaton. His subordinates hold him up in sincere emulation as their ideal in spite of any sense of humour they may have.

Aided by the Second General Staff Offr (Qu 1), Col MÜNCHBERG holds his directing hand over all supply org and orders the disposal and employment of supply tps. Amn, weapons, eqpt, fuel, clothing and adm of rear areas are the greatest of the problems in which the Second General Staff Offr, a Maj, deputises for the AQMG. But in addition he has a specialised knowledge of water and rail tpt in HOLLAND. This offr, when taken by himself, thawed out from the icy atmosphere of his chief and explained many of the difficulties in which he had had when competing with the German Civil Government in HOLLAND. It was an enlightening talk again confirming that the Army came off second best in the struggle of wits. Another Major (Qu 2) confines his work to administering rear areas, PW and Town Majors. The Qu 1 and Qu 2 each have an orderly offr and specialized branch offr to assist them. There are two such offr for amn and weapons and eqpt. One offr specializes in Engr stores, and one in POL and hard fuels such as charcoal, wood and coal. In addition to this mixture of what in the Brit Army are A and Q matters, the AQMG, through another orderly offr, is responsible for the War Diary which is compiled from a Signals log. Through this link to the CSO, the AQMG is kept in the picture on the Sigs supply situation. In the AQMGs close circle is an official for technical improvements and upkeep of eqpt and Engr stores, with yet another official as technician for CW who, when last heard of, was helping to compile the War Diary.

The Second subdivision of the Q Gp is that of Lt-Col BOCK in charge of sup, repair, and spare parts for MT. It is significant of the straitened German tpt circumstances that the two offr and one official who make up the department are all specialists in veh repair and maint and in the WE no mention is made of the TO whose duty is to collect and inspect new German vehs.

Also immediately under AQMG is the Army Intendant, Doctor WOYRISCH (IVA) an official with the equivalent rank of Col. He is a specialist adviser on food and clothing and is helped by ten minor officials. Their present worry, and by their looks they are expert worriers, is to repair the clothing they have and eke out the food, since demanding fresh supe is a matter of purely historical interest. Department IVA also incls the pymr generals reps for the Army, two officials who direct the gross distribution of money and advise on rates of pay.

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A peculiar situation in Brit eyes, arises in the posn of the DDMS (IVb) who is according to WE, under Col MUNCHEBERG although his rank and name is Surgeon Gen Doktor MEYER. It was admitted tht this subordination had caused some difficulties - "however they were only small". The explanation given is tht medical service falls under the heading "care of own tps" which is the sole concern of the AMG. At the same time it was explained tht most difficulties arose when the AMG decided tht the tpt of amn should take precedence over tpt of wounded. An adjutant for the DDMS, an old professor of hyg, and an adviser on CW injuries, make up the ofrs of the medical staff. The stores of medical eqpt, especially expendable stores, are totally inadequate and in this office more than any where else in 25 Army HQ, the air of fatalism is so pronounced tht it gives an impression of completely inhuman detachment.

IVc is the Veterinary branch, under the hawklike eye of Veterinary Col Dr STEFFENS with an Majt, a Veterinary Surgeon and Veterinary Hygiene expert. The control of Army Veterinary staffs, the distribution of horses and supervision of their care and condition is their field of work, which brings them in close contact with IV Wi. IV Wi is the dept responsible for the exploitation and use of civilian resources for 25 Army purposes. In this realm the friction between the Field Army, Army of Occupation and German Political bosses would be a delight to their best enemies if it were not for the tragic repercussions on the Dutch.


Decked in gold collar patches and green and black shoulder straps, come the postal men, all seconded from the German GPO. Three have acquired ofr status in their officialdom and ten are NCO officials. This system of direct transference of Postal Officials from civil to Army life, worked efficiently when comms were not under the constant lash of the R.F; but the last few years of poor postal comms have placed these officials in the unenviable posn of having to work magic to find letters and mail, while the work of sorting and redirecting mail, in the growing confusion was almost hopeless. It may be imagined, however, tht these postal experts rather than untrained military personnel are the best people to cope with this herculean task.

The Fifth gp, Adm A, can be said to be in many ways to connect the single soldier with the army as a whole. Personal records, Judge Advocate Branch and Chaplains department are the main stays, with the central registry and Camp Comd office making up the rest of the gp. It must have been realized from the rapid description of the Adm Q Branch tht there is no strict counter part in the German Army of either our Q or A Branches, and the nomenclature used in this account, is necessarily of an arbitrary nature.

The Adjts Department, IIA and IIB, is, according to them, the dog-body of Id. When rfts have been transferred or sent fwd, the records have to be made and ends tied up by the A Branch. If, on the other hand, a single man is to be transferred, this branch is approached direct. The Adjts Department is under Col HEINE with two Cpts Majt, IIA and IIB, guarding the interests of ofrs and ORs respectively. IIA, in addition to recording ofrs, is the channel through which promotions and directions are passed, whereas IIB gives the same service to ORs. Although 25 Army was able to maintain far tighter control of its units than almost any other senior HQ in the German Army; during the last months the work of the Majt here became extremely difficult. Battle gps, though primarily an Ops matter and bringing no alternation in the rank or status of ofrs, gave rise to many demands for reconsideration of scale of pay, and made continuous recording of a man's personal history extremely difficult.

A second sub-gp, only loosely connected with the Majt, is the JAG branch, maintained entirely by officials under Dr KUHLMANN who holds the equivalent rank of Lt.Col. He, with a deputy official, is the defending or accusing council in courts martial.

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By their side as advisers are the two other officials whose main task is to prepare the case from available documentary evidence. This stress on written evidence is quite in keeping with German Law where a large tome, the book of civil Law, replaces the Common Law of precedents as we understand it, and brings Law out of this sphere of the personal into the dispassionate realm of black and white. Apart from this a large part of army legal proceedings at higher levels had to be conducted on paper owing to the difficulties of transporting bodies from place to place.

The Chaplain's department is IVd, with a Protestant and a Catholic Chaplain and their sextons. There was no hindrance placed in the way of their work, but contact with NS welfare offrs was extremely light, doubtless arising from a tacit acceptance of the fact that neither could influence nor perhaps tolerate the other. The work of the Chaplains is the same as in any army. Jewish Chaplains are, of course, never considered.

Little need be said of the Central Registry except that it exists under an NCO official and registers messages in and out of Army HQ, independently of the Sig Centre.


The Camp Comd, a Capt, has four offrs and five officials under him to take care of the usual routine details of a static HQ such as maint of HQ MT, feeding, clothing, and paying HQ personnel. The two differences are that MC DRS are supplied by him from a pool of 35 men and that under his comd are the five officials whose duty is the censoring of Army mail.

The posn of the various offices and appointments extra to WE, is rather obscure to the German SD & Trg branch themselves. This obscurity arises from the fact that the 5 gps mentioned above are a basic arrangement of 1943 when the additional branches were not considered. Also the fact must be borne in mind that German WE regulations only lay down the composition of the separate small branches or units and only recommendations are made as to how many of these separate entities shall be put together to make up the whole HQ. There is no fixed WE for anything much larger than a company in the German Army.

Working closely with Ops Gp is the movement control branch, the offr I/C Foreign Tps, the offr I/C Horse Trg, the Anti Tk offr, the ALO and the NLO. The principle task of the Movement Control Offr is the enforcement of March Discipline on marching tps, which he achieves by patrolling the rds with his assisting offr and two NCOs. He is an adviser on general movement control but does not himself issue orders for tp movement; a job which is done by Id. The STOHL, or O I/C Foreign Tps also has no operational executive powers but rather is regarded, in spite of his high sounding title, as the man to whom questions of special foreign food, special foreign religions, special foreign footwear, in fact anything specially foreign, are referred for advice. The O I/C Horse Trg, while he too is directly concerned with Ia, hangs between Ops and Q as it is his job to see to it firstly to train recruits in horse-management and secondly to buy horse and remounts.

The Anti Tk Offr is the adviser on anti tank def and since there has never been a sufficient number of tks in 25 Army to warrant the presence of a tk Offr, the anti tk takes over the duty of adviser in all armed matters. The odd tk which came to support 25 Army was primarily for anti tk def and not for offensive Inf support. No man can have had a more heart-rending job than the GAF ALO. He, in common with many other offrs in the HQ and elsewhere, believes that their total inferiority in the air is the reason for the German defeat, an argument typically German in that, although with a grain of truth as a basis, it is quite out of proportion and does no justice to the Infantryman. This argument harks back dangerously to the old German belief that their Army as such cannot be beaten but can only be left in the lurch by others. The NLO was a much busier man in HOLLAND where the German

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
Navy held so much power and sway. The cooperation judging by the remarks of German offrs and by observations is very close between Army and Navy.

MAPS KEPT BY OPS AND INT

Ops : O of B map
 Showing own dispositions excl arty
 Arty Map
 Showing own arty dispositions
 Flooding Map
 Engr Map
 Showing minefields and barriers, principally A Tk.
 A Tk Gun Map
 Showing disposition of own A Tk guns.
 Rly Map
 Showing state of rly lines and noting available rly tpt.
 Route Map
 Showing availability and general state of rds.

Int : Ia and Ib
 O of B Map
 Showing enemy disposition and str
 Arty Map
 Showing Enemy arty dispositions.
 Patrol Map
 Showing enemy patrol activity.
 Sabotage Map
 Showing espionage and Sabotage activities.
 Terrorist Map
 Showing attacks by Dutch resistance and other persons on own tps and civilians.
 Enemy Movement Map
 Showing movement of enemy tps principally in rear areas.
 Bombing Map
 Showing place and weight of enemy bombing attacks.

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GERMAN ARMY AIR SP PROCEDURE

INTRODUCTION

The following is a report on a series of interviews between G2 Air 1 Cdn Corps and Maj KROBE, OC of the air Liaison Det at HQ 25 Army.

Maj KROBE, who is a regular Air Force Offr, joined the army in 1929 as a pte, where he stayed in a MG bn until 1936 when the Luftwaffe was officially formed. His first ops were in the Polish Campaign in 1939 where he flew as a long range recce pilot. Service in the Balkans followed this and then he was sent to the Eastern Front where after a tour as a recce pilot he became an airforce LO. Maj KROBE was transferred to the Western Front as recently as Jan 45 to 25 Army where he has held the same job since.

Maj KROBE has a very high opinion of the RAF and stated that the combination of Strategical, semi-Strategical and Tactical bombing has been, in his opinion, the greatest single factor in winning the war for the Allies. Of these three phases of bombing he puts Close Sp and Tactical bombing at the top of the list as most effective, with Strategical bombing next and lastly semi-Strategical bombing. He stated that in his opinion no matter how hy Strategical bombing became it could not, of itself, be decisive without the Close Sp attacks as well.

AIR STAFFS AT FMNSArmy

The air sp staff at Army HQ consists of:-

OC Air Force Liaison Det (Fuehrer des luftwaffen verbindunge kommando)

AA Liaison Offr (Flak verbindungs offizier)

Air Force Int Offr (IC luftwaffen)


These were usually air force ex op types who had been engaged in army co-op generally. Major KROBE had been long range recce pilot himself. During the latter stages his job was entirely that of co-ordination of air recce with the Int Branch. The procedure was to discuss possible moves of our tps with Int and direct his recce accordingly in order to confirm their suspicions. The interpretation of any casual recce was left to Int.

Corps

The air force rep at Corps is a GAF sigs offr. He has very little responsibility apparently beyond passing some demands and keeping the Flieger Div which works with the Corps completely in the ground picture. The whole target demand setup seems to be loosely knit, e.g. the demands might be passed either through ops or int channels to Army, where the air staff would pass it laterally to the Flieger Div HQ, or as explained above, they might be passed on receipt by the GAF offr at Corps, to the supporting Flieger Div. In such a case, air staff at Army would be advised purely for infm by a message "sent later".

Divs and Bdes

There were no tentacles such as we know them at bdes or divs, although a Rover or contact car was often employed in much the same manner as ours. Tele comms seem to have been used



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exclusively, with wireless "as an alternative". The contact car received its demands by phone or intercepted messages broadcast from recon aircraft. It is interesting to note that apparently no facilities for obtaining air sp other than by tele were provided for inf divs. Panzer divs, presumably designed and intended for breakthrough, were allotted a contact tk. This contact tk could demand sp either from aircraft already airborne or from Corps or Army.

GENERAL PROCEDURE

In discussing past and present procedures it is difficult to draw a clear line between what the original setup was two years ago and the procedure adopted since. In answer to questions, Maj KROBE repeatedly stated that such and such "was originally intended" or that "the ideal is so and so" indicating that various procedures, originally part of the setup and taken as a matter of course, fell into disuse as the Luftwaffe's fortunes dwindled. It may be said that the German Army apparently never relied on its air force to the extent to which we do, and so was not prepared at any level to make the elaborate arrangements which we have considered essential (ALOs, Gs3 Air at divs, etc), except in the case of a special offensive. The procedures outlined below may be taken as employed from 1940 to 1941, the last two years having witnessed the abolition of contact cars, tks and FCPs or their equivalent, the reduction of staffs at various levels and other changes attendant on what amounted to the loss of all but a recon air force.

One of the main differences in the German setup is the lack of an Army/Air setup at Army level comparable to ours. Whereas the "focus" of all our air sp is, strictly speaking, at the Army/RAF Gp level, it is more at the Corps/Flieger div level in the German Army. This is deduced from the fact that "the decision to attack a target rests with the Flieger Div HQ", which is usually placed in sp of a Corps for a spell of ops. The GAF air staff at Army are not covered off by any Army/Air staff types and should controversy arise over the engaging of a target the matter is discussed between Air Force staff offrs and the Ops or Int people at Army.

It would appear that any demands for air sp are generally passed as quickly as possible by tele to Flieger Div HQ with whom all decisions rests. The main tasks of air staff offrs at fmns (Corps and Army) are to advise the Army, keep the GAF in the picture and "post-office" the sp demands.


GCC - FLIEGER DIV HQ

From several pts of view it appears that Flieger Div HQ combines most of the essential functions of both our Gp HQ and GCC. It is obviously not sited in close proximity to its army fm but depends on the work of the GAF Air Liaison Det at Army HQ for keeping in the picture.

In the matter of Army/Air LOs there are none of them employed at any pt in the Army/Air setup. Air sp is purely an Air Force controlled matter, and the providing of army offrs to brief pilots was "not considered sufficiently important to be undertaken".

BOMB LINE

The fixing of the bomb line rested with Flieger Div HQ on infm supplied by GAF offr at Corps HQ. This infm was passed direct to Flieger Div HQ from Corps and not through Army. Divs



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passed back only line of fwd tps, and if the GAF wanted to fly a mission of their own they might call the Corps and get a check on the line of fwd tps first.

Re briefing the pilots as to the bomb line, this was done in the course of normal op briefing, by the CO of the mission. He was kept advised of the bomb line by Flieger Div HQ.

No gen safety margin was laid down but the position of the bomb line as decided by Flieger Div depended on their estimate of the accuracy and dependability of the pilots carrying out the particular mission.

RECCE PROCEDURE

Recce aircraft were employed in the following manner:-

The pilot broadcast while airborne to five stations on his net. In as far as any control was exercised at all, the aircraft was Control and the out stations were Army, Corps, PZ div, Flieger Div and Recce Sqn. It appears that VHF was used and this would have been reasonable as nearly all the traffic was broadcast by the aircraft. Occasional requests were sent up by one of the out stations and no traffic at all was necessary between ground stations. When a good target was broadcast it was acted upon by Flieger Div HQ, who actually ordered the aircraft up (cf. GCC), the army stations listening out for infm only. When necessary, the contact tk with the Pz Div was an additional out station.

RLY INTERDICTION

Maj KROBE stated that the interdiction of rly lines was of slight nuisance value only, and providing that only the line itself was cratered, could be repaired very quickly by engr units which were stationed conveniently along the main lines. The destruction of marshalling yds and goods trains, the latter particularly when on the move, was an extremely serious matter. It would appear from this that the effect of attacks on rolling stocks was of much greater nuisance than the actual interdiction of lines themselves.

AIR COUNTER BATTERY

Our air attacks, in a CB role, are described as "very effective". Bombing is less feared than cannon and MG straffing and nothing less than a direct hit is effective at all. The greatest damage done in these air attacks is to eqpts and not to personnel, since the latter can always get under ground at short notice.


ROCKET ATTACKS

The excellent cones obtained and the great accuracy with which rockets could be used made them a very dreaded weapon. 25 Army HQ is cited as an example.

FIRE BOMBS

It was stated that fire bombs, while capable of burning bush and ground, especially during dry weather, was generally of only morale value in attacks which were made on the enemy either in the open or in buildings. The material damage done by fire bombs does not appear in the opinion of Maj KROBE to have been serious, although the morale effect was great.

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BRIEFING MATERIAL

For a "teed-up" op the briefing material used was similar in most respects to that which is prepared by us at Army level. Enlargements stereopairs, flak traces and large scale maps, were all employed in the event of a major op by the Air Force. The responsibility to sup this material was entirely an Air Force one and was done by the staff of Flieger Div with the assistance from Flieger Corps. The targets to be engaged were decided upon at a joint Army/Air conference beforehand and from then on the matter was entirely in the hands of the GAF. Again, emphasis is laid on the fact that no army offrs were concerned in the preparation of the briefing material or the briefing itself. Maj KROBE said that civ reports were seldom used in target material.

NIGHT HARASSING ATTACKS


It was stated that our night harassing attacks on enemy MT and tpt cols and comms generally was not an unqualified success. The reason given for this is that before accurate bombing could be done flares had to be dropped to identify the target area or to pinpt the pilot on his way there, and this always gave warning and time to the dvrs to disperse their vehs.

AIR RAID WARNING SYSTEM

Att to each corps HQ is an early warning intercept unit of an NCO and four or five men, all GAF sigs personnel. Each unit within a sector is given a certain frequency range to monitor, the set used being the FU 17 Special Intercept Set. All messages are picked up and translated by this unit and if a message is considered as IMMEDIATE it is telephoned at once to Int at the corps HQ. The decision as to what constitutes an IMPORTANT message rests entirely with the NCO IC this unit so that his responsibility may at times be considerable.

When the message is received at corps a "clear the line" call is made to the fm which is to receive the attack. The warning of this attack is passed in code even over the tele. As tele comms are usually very good warnings are seldom if ever passed over the air. All messages other than immediate messages are logged and a resume of the days air sp messages is passed to the HQs of the air force signals coy to which the unit belongs. From coy HQ this resume is passed to Flieger Div HQ where it is scanned and any indications of developments in our air sp technique or changes in our procedure are passed on to Flieger Corps HQ for the infm of the Air Force Comd.

The time taken to warn a unit provided normal tele comms remain is in the neighbourhood of 10 minutes. It is of interest that the entire warning system is controlled by and composed of Air Force personnel.



APPX 'A'

W.R. ESTABLISHMENT (ARMY HQ)

Serial letter	Army Command	Offrs	Officials	NCOs	ORs
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Command Group(a) Command and Chief of the
General Staff


A	Commander in Chief	1			
	Chief of the General Staff				
	General Staff Offr	1			
K	A.D.C. to the Commander in Chief and Chief of the General Staff	1			
K	Administration Offr for special use	1			
M	Personnel, batmen				2
	Total	4			2

(b) Operations Group

1.) Ia


	first General Staff Offr(Ia)	1			
	fourth General Staff Offr(Id)	1			
K	First Adm Offr (OI)	1			
K	Fourth Adm Offr (O4)	1			
B	Survey Offr of Engrs (Ia Survey)	1			
K	General Duty Offrs	2			
	NCOs				
O	first Clerk Ia				1
G	clerk (1 telescope)				2
G	draftsman				1
G	Book-binder				1
M	personnel - clerks and draftsmen				8

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
Serial letter	Army Command	Offrs	Officials	NCOs	ORs
	2.) Ic				
	third General Staff				
	Offr (Ic) X)	1			
K	third Adm Offr (OS)	1			
K	Interpreter)	1			
Z	) XX)	1			
	Interpreter)	1			
G	NCO, Clerk				
M	Personnel, clerks and draftsmen			1	
	Ic/FSS				
B	FSO				4
K	Specialist Offr	1			
		1			
B	Censor Offr	1			
	Sum carried over from (b) Comd Staff	14		6	12
NOTE:					
X) Can be seconded from Regimental duties.					
XX) The number of interpreters adjusts itself according to the need of the moment; special directions are unnecessary.					
B	Offr for spiritual welfare	1			
G	NCO, Clerk				
M	OR, personnel, clerk			1	
					2
	Total	15		7	14
(C) Weapons Officers					
1) Staff Offrs of Arty					
R	Staff Offr of Arty	1			
K	Ajutant	1			
G	NCO clerk				
M	OR clerk			1	
M	Draftsman				2
					1
	Total	2		1	3
					3/



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Serial letter	Army Command	Offrs	Officials	NCOs	ORs
<u>2.) Army Engr Commander</u>					
J	Army Engr Commander	1			
R	Offr of Engrs	1			
K	Adjutant	1			
K	Specialist, official of the Higher Tech Service (Engr)		1		
O	NCO First Clerk			1	
G	Technician			2	
M	OR Clerk				3
Total		3	1	3	3
<u>3.) Army Sigs Commander</u> (acts as well as Supply Specialist for Sigs Bpt)					
J	Army Sigs Commander	1			
K	Adjutant	1			
B	Specialist (1 Radio, 1 Telephone)	2			
K	Cipher Offr	1			
K	Co-worker, official of Higher Tech Service (Sigs)		1		
O	Signal Master			1	
G	Clerk			2	
G	Draftsman			1	
M	OR Clerk and Typist				3
N	Draftsman				1
Total		5	1	4	4
<u>4.) Staff Offrs Gas Def</u>					
B	Gas Def Offrs	1			
G	NCO clerk trained in Gas Def			1	
M	Clerk - Draftsman				1
Total		1		1	1

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Serial
Letter

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(d) Army QM Staff


Offrs Officials NCOs ORs

Serial Letter	Description	Offrs	Officials	NCOs	ORs
D	<u>Army QM (O.Q.)</u> Army QM	1			
	Second Gen Staff Offr (Qu 1)	1			
B	Qu 2, Regtl Offr	1			
K	Second Adm Offr (02)	1			
K	Fifth Adm Offr (05)	1			
B Dept	Specialist for Amn (W)	1			
B Dept	Specialist for Weapons and eqpt (W)	1			
B Dept	Specialist for Engr eqpt	1			
K	Co-worker for Inf and Arty Eqpt (W)	1			
K	Co-worker for amn (W)	1			
B X-	Specialist for Fuel Supply	1			
K	Adm Offr for O.Q. (acts also as liaison offr to Army Chief Signal Offr)	1			
Z X-	Orderly Offr	1			
K	Co-worker for Army; Engr Eqpt, official of Higher tech service (MT)		1		
K	Co-worker for C.W. Eqpt, official of Higher tech Service (CW)		1		
<u>NCOs</u>					
O	Artificer			1	
	Supply Sgt (1-CW 2 ord in 1 Engr)			4	
G	First Clerk			1	
O	For Fuel Supply			1	
G	Clerks			6	
M	men, clerks				10
Total		13	2	14	10

2.) Army MT Offr

Serial Letter	Description	Offrs	Officials	NCOs	ORs
R X-	Army MT Offr	1			
X-	Specialist for MT repair	1			
Total		2			

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Army QM Staff (cont'd)


NOTE:

X-) According to the personnel requirements either Regimental Offr, or Engr Offr.

XX) Serial can also be filled by Registrar, official of the middle service.

Serial Letter		Offrs	Officials	NCOs	ORs
	Carry over of D/2/Army MT Offr	2			
K	Co-worker X)	1			
K	Co-worker, official of Higher Tech Service (K)		2		
O	NCO Supply Sergeant			1	
G	Clerk			2	
M	OR Clerks				4
	Total	3	2	3	4
3/IV(a) (Acts as Army Intendent)					
J	Army Intendent, Official of Higher Intendent Service (IV(a))		1		
R	Specialist, Official of the Higher Intendent Service		4		
K	Co-worker - Official of the Higher Intendent Service		6		
G	NCO Clerk			3	
M	OR Clerk				3
<u>FOR ARMY PAY SERVICE</u>					
K	Leading Pay Master, Official of the Higher Arm Service		1		
Z	Paymaster, Official of the Higher Service		1		
G	NCO Clerk			1	
	Total		13	4	3

.....6/



Serial Letter		- 6 -			
		Offrs	Officials	NCOs	ORs
<u>4/IVb DDMS Office</u>					
J	IV(b) DDMS	1			
K	Medical Offr Adj	1			
	Medical Offr (1 Hygiene Officer XX 1 Specialist for CW XXX Questions)	2			
B	Specialist, Pharmacist, Official of the Higher Services		1		
O	Senior NCO Chief Clerk			1	
G 7	Storeman, Druggist			1	
G	Clerks			2	
G	OR Clerks				2
Total		4	1	4	2

NOTE:


XX) If the Hygiene Offr is consulting Hygienist of the Army, he qualifies for Serial Gp "R".

XXX) If the specialist for CW Questions is also consulting Pharmacist, he qualifies for Serial Gp "R".

5/IVc Army Veterinary Office X

J	IVc Army Veterinary	1			
K	Veterinary Offr, Adj	1			
B	Advisory Veterinary Surgeon	1			
B	Advisory Veterinary Hygienist	1			
K	Veterinary Offr X)	1			
<u>NCOs</u>					
O	first Clerk			1	
G	Clerk			1	
<u>ORs</u>					
M	Clerk				1
M	Clerk (also Lab man)				1
Total		5		2	2


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Serial Letter		Offrs	Officials	NCOs	ORs
	<u>6) Army Field Postmaster</u>				
R	Army Field Postmaster, Higher official of the German GPO		1		
B	Special worker, Higher official of the German GPO		2		
K	Collaborator, Official of the German GPO		3		
O	Field Post Assistant, official of the German GPO		3		
G	Field Post Steward, official of the German GPO		4		
	Total		13		
	<u>(e) Adjutant's Office</u>				
	<u>1.) Adj (IIa)</u>				
R	First Adj (IIa)	1			
B	Second Adj (IIb)	1			
	<u>NCOs</u>				
O	First Clerk		1		
G	Clerk		2		
M	ORs - Clerk				3
	Total	2	3		3
	<u>2.) Army Justice Dept III XX)</u>				
R	Col of the Legal Council of the Army		1		
B	Judge, official of the Higher Legal Service		1		
K	Documents Official of the Dept of Justice. Official of the Higher Legal Service		1		
Z	Documents official of the Dept of Justice. Official of the Higher Legal Service		1		
G	NCO Clerk		1		
M	ORs Clerk				2
	Total	4	1		2

.....8/



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(e) Adjutant's Office (cont'd)

NOTE:

- X) The arrangement of Veterinary post for the supervision of fodder supply will be ordered for the individual Army Commands.
- XX) The number of judges (Serial Letter B) and the Documents officials (serial Letter Z) will be increased according to the need for circuit judges and/or Documents officials.

Serial letter		Offrs	Officials	NCOs	ORs
3.) <u>Army Chaplains (IVd)</u>					
B/R	Army Chaplains		2		
O/Z	XX Sextons, officials		2		
	Total		4		
4.) <u>Central Registry</u>					
Z	Registrar, official of the middle Adm Service		1		
O	NCO			1	
G	NCO			1	
M	ORs			2	3
	Total		1	4	3
5.) <u>HQ (H Qu)</u>					
(aa) Camp Commandant					
B	Commandant	1			
Z	Aux Offr	1			
B	Section MO	1			
<u>WOs & NCOs</u>					
O	RSM			1	
G	i/c Adm Duties			1	
G	Eqpt NCO (acts also as i/c baggage party)			1	
G	Clerk			1	
O	Medical NCO			1	
<u>ORs</u>					
M	Clerks				4
M	For Adm Duties				34

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5.) HQ (H Qu) (cont'd)

Serial letter		Offrs	Officials	NCOs	Ors
	<u>ORs</u>				
M	Tailors (acts also as co-driver)				3
M	Shoemakers				4
M	Medical Orderly				1
	Total	3		5	46

(bb) Paymaster (IVz)

Z	Paymaster, official of the Higher Admin Service		1		
G	NCOs accountant			2	
	<u>ORs</u>				
M	Accountant				1
M	Clerks				2
	Total		1	2	3

NOTE:

XX Appointments can be filled with NCO appts "G" when qualified officials are not available.

CC) Ration Group

O	Ration NCO			1	
G	Ration NCO			1	
G	Field NCO Cooks			2	
M	OR, Field Cooks (3 act as co-drivers for lorries)				4
	Total			4	4


dd) MT Detachment

K	Offr Commanding	1			
G	NCO for veh repair			1	
G	NCO for POL			1	

Personnel-vehicle Section

G	NCO - Gp leader also driver of staff car			4	
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dd) MT Detachment (cont'd)

Serial letter	Offrs	Officials	NCOs	Ors Kfz
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Personnel-vehicle Section

M

Lt pers carrying vehs				15
Med pers carrying vehs				10
Hy pers carrying vehs				10
Med (cross country) pers carrying vehs				5

Lorry Section

G

NCO - Section leader also lorry dvr			2	
--	--	--	---	--

M

OR - lorry dvr				15
Dvrs				5

Light open lorries 1½ ton for rations				2
--	--	--	--	---

Light open lorries 1½ ton for Petrol				1
---	--	--	--	---

Medium open lorries 3 ton for 3 large Field Kitchen Stoves				3
---	--	--	--	---

Medium open lorries 3 ton for baggage				2
---------------------------------------	--	--	--	---

Medium open lorries 3 ton for POL				1
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Medium open lorries 3 ton for Office Eqpt				2
---	--	--	--	---

Hy open lorries 4½ ton for Office Eqpt				1
--	--	--	--	---

Trailers (multi-wheeled) 3 ton open Office Eqpt				1
---	--	--	--	---


Medium motor busses (2 available for comd vehs)				5
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Total	1	8	60	58
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SUMMARY

				Veh
(a)	Comd in Chief and Chief of Gen Staff	4		2
(b)	Ops Group	15	7	14

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
SUMMARY (cont'd)

	Offrs	Official	NCOs	ORs	Veh
(c) Weapons Offrs					
1) Offrs of Arty	2		1	3	
2) Army Engr Comd	3	1	3	3	
3) Army Sigs Offrs	5	1	4	4	
4) Offrs for Gas Def	1		1	1	
(d) Chief QM Dept					
1) Chief QM	13	4	17	14	
2) V Army MT Offr	3	2	3	4	
3) IV(a) /also Army Intendent		13	4	3	
4) IV(b)/also Army MO	4	1	4	2	
5) IV(c)/also Army Vet	5		2	2	
6) Army Fd Postal Service		13			
(e) Adjutant Branch					
1) Adj (11a)	2		3	3	
2) Army Legal Branch (III)		4	1	2	
3) Army Chaplain (IVd)		4			
4) Central Registry		1	3	3	
5) Headquarters					
aa) Camp Commander	3		5	46	
bb) Pay Office (IVz)		1	2	3	
cc) Ration Detachment			4	4	
dd) MT Detachment	1		16	105 MT 59 Trailer(1) MC 43 (11)	
ee) Field Post Censor 5			5	17	
Total Strength of Army HQ	66	45	85	235	

NOTE:

1. For the service distribution, especially for the distribution of clerk strengths, the war establishment is not proportionate.
2. 10 persons are to be appointed as auxiliary stretcher bearers.

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SUMMARY NOTE (cont'd)

3. In Serial Gp "G" there are 12 positions for Sgts.
4. The unit forms a gas trg section consisting of one leader and 3 men.
5. An offr is to be in charge of gas def exercises.
6. An NCO is to be assigned as Gas Def NCO.

Date: 1-4-43

Serial Letter	Offrs	Officials	NCOs	ORs	Veh
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II Individual Groups additional
to Establishment

(a) Movement Control Office

B	Offr for Movement Control	1			
K	Auxiliary Offrs	1			

NCOs

O	For local protection			2	
G	Clerks			1	

ORs

M	Draftsman				1
M	Dvr for a pers veh and medium pers vehs				4 4

Total

2		3	5	4
---	--	---	---	---

(b) Field Police

B	LPM	1			
K	Regimental or Fd Police offr	2			

NCOs

G	Clerk			1	
G	Draftsman			1	

G	Section leader of the MC DRS			1	1
---	------------------------------	--	--	---	---

ORs

M	Clerk and Draftsman			2	
M	Motorecyclist (med MC)			5	5

M	Truck dvr for pers veh, med pers veh			2	2
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Total


3		3	9pers2	2
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Motorecycles

6

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	Offrs	officials	NCOs	ORs	Veh
(c) Offr of Horse Tpt and Trg					
R	Offr i/c	1			
K	Auxiliary Offr	1			
O	NCO supply Sgt		1		
<u>ORs</u>					
	Clerk			1	
	Truck dvr for pers veh light pers veh			1	1
	Total	2	1	2	1
(Carried over from Lorry Section)					
	DR Section	1	8	60	
G	NCO - Section leaders on lt MC		7		7
M	OR - DRs (25 lt MCs - 10 Hy MC with sidecars)			35	35 (10)
<u>MT - Repair Section</u>					
O	NCO - Supply Sgt leader in MC Sidecar		1		
M	OR - MC rider also motor mechanics (hy MC with sidecar)			1	(1)
M	OR - Motor Mechanic			6	
M	OR - Electric Mechanics (also 2nd dvr for lorry)			1	
M	OR - MT dvr (1 for pers Army veh 1 fr lorry) also motor mechanics small repair wagons (MT veh 2/40)			2	
	Med lorry (3 ton) open for pers				1
	Tpt and spare parts				1
	Total	1	16	105	MT veh 59 Trail- (1) ers MC 43 MC sidecars (11)
<u>ee) Field Post Censor</u>					
K	Commander	1			
Z	Censor	4			
G	NCO, Censor		5		
M	OR, Censor			17	
	Total	5	5	17	

