Stages of withdrawal: Canada in Afghanistan, 2010–2014

Canadian Brigadier-General Dean Milner took command of Joint Task Force Afghanistan in September 2010. A surge of 30,000 American troops had recently arrived in the country to check the Taliban’s momentum. Many of the new forces arrived in Kandahar where Canada had been holding the line. But now, Canada’s focus was increasingly fixed on preparing the Afghan government’s national security forces to take over the fight.

This effort involved extensive collaboration and training with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police. Milner developed a close relationship with Afghan Brigadier-General Ahmad Habibi. Habibi was a long-serving veteran, having fought during the Soviet occupation and the ensuing civil war.

“One of my roles,” Milner says, “was to help mentor him and his brigade, because I knew eventually Canada would leave, eventually the Americans would leave.” He recalls, “So, him and I patrolled together, we ate together, we did everything together.”

Development work was part of Canada’s strategy in Afghanistan. Decades of war had deprived Afghanistan of critical infrastructure and basic amenities. Building projects were an attempt to make improvements for local communities.

The Dahla Dam Project, involving the rehabilitation of an extensive irrigation system, was Canada’s signature project in Kandahar. It cost approximately $50 million over the project’s lifetime. Originally, the dam had allowed for 36,000 hectares of prime farmland to be irrigated. Decades of war and neglect had vastly reduced its capacity.

Lisa Vandehei is a former soldier who later joined the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). She managed the Dahla Dam project. She notes that repairing the dam required considerable effort on the local community level. The Afghans who took part often lived in areas under Taliban influence. She says, “It was dangerous for them if they were seen working with a foreigner. It was very, very dangerous for them. And I was repeatedly surprised at their willingness to risk their lives to work with us.”

Planning and logistics are essential to a modern military. These were the source of Eyre’s concerns. He points to their lack of ability “to conceive and plan operations on their own. The ability to sustain themselves, to organize logistics to keep them fed, fueled, with the supply of ammunition in the field.”

Moreover, the ANA wasn’t a cohesive institution. Afghanistan’s social web of family, regional, and tribal identity had carried over into the ranks. This created competing loyalties and unstable hierarchies of command.

The ANA’s unpredictable complexity was seen most dramatically when ANA trainees killed their NATO trainers. By the end of 2012, more than one hundred coalition troops had been killed in so-called “green-on-blue” attacks. It was unclear if these were spontaneous outbursts of violence or a coordinated Taliban campaign.

Cultural differences and language barriers were known to cause friction between western trainers and Afghan trainees. Trainers had to manage the fact that outbursts of violence might result from insults or disrespect but might also be a deliberate tactic to disrupt the training mission. And of course, training often involved trusting trainees with live explosives and ammunition.

Fortunately, no Canadians were killed in these incidents.

The month after Canada’s departure, Afghanistan held an election to replace outgoing President Hamid Karzai. Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah were the top candidates, but neither won a definitive majority.

After a few months of negotiations, increased Taliban activity, and allegations of ballot stuffing, they agreed to share power. Ghani was named the new president and Abdullah took the newly created prime-ministerial position of Chief Executive. Despite these tensions, this was the first time Afghanistan had experienced a peaceful transfer of power between democratic governments.

Eyre points out that, “Sixty percent of the population showed up to vote, very comparable to Western democracies. So, this was actually a point of psychological hope, success in the spring of 2014.” However, he wishes that Canada had waited to leave until after this watershed moment. It could thereby have concluded its mission with a sense of achievement rather than departing out of simple political and budgetary necessity.

Canada’s time in Afghanistan was over. But the story of its war in Afghanistan is not. The legacy and consequences of Canada’s longest war live on, individually for those who served, and collectively for the country as a whole.